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gests that state legislation is the proper antidote for anti-labor injunctions.4 But comparatively few state acts give such protection as does the Norris-LaGuardia Act,s and
the possibility under present conditions of the spread of such legislation is remote. 6
Indeed, the Court's suggestion appears to involve an implicit admission that labor
cannot expect adequate protection for picketing from the judiciary under the free
speech category. The holding of AFL v. Swing r7 decided the same day as the principal
case, may be cited against this view. There the Court held that, notwithstanding state
common law which outlawed peaceful picketing in the absence of an immediate employer-employee relationship, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of discussion
applies. And it cannot be denied that the very recognition that there is a constitutional
protection is important. Nonetheless, legislative recognition of picketing as a part of
union activity essential to the attainment of union aims would provide a more realistic
basis for defining the limits of its protection.

Labor Law-Picketing-Interpretation of Statute Prohibiting "Loitering" near Defense Industries-[Ontario.-The defendant, leader in a labor dispute, peacefully
picketed the Windsor, Ontario, plant of Chrysler Corporation of Canada, Ltd. When
he disregarded the request of a constable that he leave the premises, the defendant was
arrested and convicted for violating Regulation 6(3) of the Defense of Canada Regulations (Consolidation) 1940, which provides that "no person loitering in the vicinity
.... of any premises [designated for the performance of services essential to the Canadian defense program] shall continue to loiter in that vicinity after being requested
by the appropriate person to leave it."' Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Ontario, held, that Regulation 6(3) applies, even though the "loiterer" is picketing the
plant during a labor dispute. Judgment affirmed. Rex v. Burt.2
Without the aid of written constitutional guarantees such as the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Canadian courts ordinarily protect fundamental personal rights by means of a long-established technique of interpretation.3
They frequently resolve ambiguity in a social security act, an act imposing penalties,
'4 The Illinois anti-injunction statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 48, § 2a, was interpreted
by the lower court to apply only to disputes between employers and employees. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E. (2d) 308 (1939).
is For an analysis of state statutes see Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Injunction Legislation, 14
Ore. L. Rev. 5o (1935); 23 Corn. L. Q. 339 (1938).
16Legislation pending in Congress and the state legislatures contemplates the curtailing
rather than expansion of labor activities. See Picketing and Free Speech, 9 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 185 (1940).
X761 S. Ct. 568 (194r).

'P.C. 4750,3 Proclamations and Orders in Council 90 (Canada 194o); Defense of Canada
Regulations (Consolidation) 194o, reg. 6(3). These regulations were made by the Governor
General of Canada in Council pursuant to the War Measures Act 1914 (2d session) c. 2, § 6.
Rev. Stat. Can. (i927) c. 2o6, § 3. Reg. 3(I) provides that the Minister of Justice designate
certain industries which he considers essential to the defense program to which the regulations
thereafter apply.
D.L.R. 598 (Ont.).
Willis, Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 16 Can. B. Rev. z (1938).
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or a tax statute by employing "presumptions" to arrive at a hypothetical legislative
intention.4 By declaring that Parliament could not have meant to abridge a common
law right, take property without compensation, bar subjects from the courts, or interfere with personal liberty, the courts usually defeat what would seem to have been the
actual legislative intention.s When the Dominion is at war, however, the Canadian
courts abandon these presumptions in interpreting wartime legislation and hold that
in the emergency individual rights must be subordinated to the national purpose as
stated by Parliament. 6
Picketing has fared similarly at the hands of the Canadian courts. They refuse to
enjoin peaceful picketing connected with a labor dispute, even though the pickets are
not related contractually to the enterpriser picketed.7 But Regulation 6(3), as interpreted by the court in the present case, seems to abridge completely this common law
right. The defendant contended that the term "loitering" should not be construed to
include peaceful picketing, because the right to strike was excepted from the scope of
subsequent Regulations 27 and 29.8 But the court refused to apply this saving proviso
to Regulation 6(3), since the subsequent sections are widely separated from it and since,
furthermore, they were drafted to prevent sabotage, while Regulation 6(3) was to pre4 Willis,

Administrative Law and the British North American Act, 53 Harv. L. Rev.
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(1939).

5 Note 3 supra; Rex v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260 (involving a conflict between the ordinary
presumptions in favor of the subject and the desire of the court to promote national unity in an
emergency); Croxford v. Universal Ins. Co., Ltd., [19361 i All Eng. x~i (C.A.) (construing the
workmen's compensation acts in favor of the classes of persons for whose benefit they were
passed). Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of English Housing Legislation, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 426 (1936); Hancock, Discharge of Deportees on Habeas Corpus, 14
Can. B. Rev. ii6 (1936).
6In the case of Spitz v. Secretary of State of Canada, [i939] 2 D.L.R. 546, 549 (Can. Ex.),
the president of the court said: "when you come to interpret ....

war measure[s] ....

such

measures must be given that construction which will best secure the end the authors had in
mind. One must consider not only the wording of the war measures but also their purposes,
the motives which led to their enactment, and the conditions prevailing at the time." Rex v.
Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260; Re Gray, 42 D.L.R. r (Can. 1918); Fort Frances Pulp and Paper
Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co., [1923] 3 D.L.R. 629 (Imp. P.C.).

7 Canadian courts prohibit peaceful picketing only when they find it to have been "wrongful." They consider peaceful picketing wrongful if the statements of the pickets are defamatory, if the picketing is conducted for purposes other than obtaining or communicating information, or if it is a part of a conspiracy to injure. The regulations interpreted to prohibit picketing
in industries essential to the Canadian defense program do not apply to picketing in establishments not engaged in producing defense materials. Canada Dairies, Ltd. v. Seggie, [1940]
4 D.L. . 725 (Ont.) (refusing to restrain peaceful picketing of a non-defense industry; decided
after proclamation of Defense of Canada Regulations); see Finkelman, The Law of Picketing
in Canada,

2 Toronto

LJ. 67 (1937), 344 (I938). A fruitful comparison might be made between

this treatment of picketing at Canadian common law and the protection of picketing under the
Thornhill case in the United States. See text accompanying notes 9 and io infra; Laskin,
Picketing: A Comparison of Certain Canadian and American Doctrines, 15 Can. B. Rev. io
(1937).
5
Defense of Canada Regulations (Consolidation) 194o. Reg. 27 provides that "a person
shall not be guilty under this Regulation by reason only of his taking part in, or peacefully
persuading others to take part in, a strike."
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vent espionage. The court, undoubtedly influenced by considerations of wartime
necessity, interpreted the regulation very strictly in order to conclude that protection
against espionage demands the prohibition of peaceful picketing of essential industries.
This construction was achieved by extending and applying to picketing the purpose of
the proclamation as stated in Regulation i-"securing the public safety and the defense of Canada."
In the United States the Supreme Court protects peaceful picketing under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.9 This protection was first accorded in
Thornhill v. Alabamalo where the court invalidated a state statute which without limitation prohibited loitering and picketing. Prior to that case many courts had recognized the common law right to picket peacefully, being influenced by the argument
that workingmen in their struggle for higher wages and better working conditions
might combine to do in unison what they could otherwise do individually.x% Should
peaceful picketing interfere with the accelerated national defense program, this common law right to picket peacefully, as well as its constitutional protection, will probably be challenged. In the Thornhill case Mr. Justice Murphy recognized certain exceptional situations 2 characterized by dangers to the state or society so great that "no
opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of
public opinion" should be afforded.3 This language is reminiscent of that employed in
decisions construing statutes limiting other personal rights guaranteed by the consti9 In the case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 3oi U.S. 468 (1937), Mr. Justice
Brandeis first suggested that peaceful picketing has the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech. The dictum was accepted by the court in Thornhill v. Alabama, 3io U.S. 88 (i94o);
see Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (1940).
1"3 io U.S. 88 (I94O), noted in 39 Mich. L. Rev. Io (1940), 26 Va. L. Rev.1o63 (194o), and
2o Boston U. L. Rev. 574 (1940).

"*Some courts have upheld the common law right to picket peacefully: Steffes v. Motion
Picture Machine Operators' Union, 136 Minn. 2oo, i6i N.E. 524 (917); Empire Theatre Co. v.
Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107 (1917); Kissam v. United States Printing Co. i99 N.Y. 76,
92 N.E. 214 (I9IO); see Smith and Delancey, The State Legislatures and Unionism, 38 Mich.
L. Rev. 987 (i94o); Frankfurter and Green, The Labor Injunction 32, 116, 207-208 (930).
Contra: Lyon and Healy v. Piano, Organ & Musical Instrument Workers' Int'l Union, 289
Ill. 176, 124 N.E. 443 (i919); Clarage v. Luphringer, 202 Mich. 612, i68 N.W. 44o (igi8);
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, i56 Cal. 70, io3 Pac. 324 (igog); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass.
92, 44 N.E. 1077 (i896); see Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 73
(1936).
2 In Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941), noted
in 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 779 (1941), the Court indicated that picketing preceded by "disorder
and continuing intimidation" comes within the exception stated in the Thornhill case. Cf.
Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 281 N.Y. 150, 22 N.E. (2d) 320 (1939),
noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 171 (i939). In Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Milk
and Ice Cream Drivers and Dairies Employees, 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 6o,094 (Wis.
194o), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld, as within the Thornhill exception, a statute
making it an unfair labor practice to picket an employer when a majority in a collective bargaining unit of his employees had not voted to strike. But see AFL v. Swing, 6i S. Ct. 568 (I94I)
(reversing the Supreme Court of Illinois which had held that stranger picketing cannot be
peaceful).
X3Thornhill v. Alabama, 3io U.S. 88, io5 (194o).
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tution, but those cases do not indicate unambiguously whether the legislature or the
courts are to make the determination.4 In Schenck v. United States's the defendant was
convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 for distributing leaflets attacking the World
War system of compulsory military service. The court itself determined that the defendant's activity constituted in the circumstances a "dear and present danger" to
successful prosecution of the war. This "clear and present danger" test was qualified
in Gitlow v. New York.' 6 The court there employed the presumption that the statute
to prevent "criminal anarchy" was constitutional and so accepted the legislative determination that the prohibited acts were imminently dangerous. This presumption of
constitutionality was again employed in Whitney v. California,'7which upheld a state
anti-syndicalism statute. In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Brandeis warned that
if the court presume constitutionality, any such presumption would be rebuttable.
And in Herndon v. Lowry,'8 while approving the Gitlow case, the court itself determined
that the prohibited acts of the defendant did not constitute a "clear and present danger."
The Court in the Thornhill case, by apparently accepting Mr. justice Brandeis's interpretation of the "clear and present danger" test, has indicated that statutes abridging personal liberties, although carefully drawn to avert a particular danger, must still
meet the test of judicial review.19 just as freedom of speech has been restricted when
its exercise endangered the nation's success at war, the constitutional protection of
peaceful picketing may similarly be restricted. It may be argued, however, that even
if such a restrictive statute could be upheld as being within the exception to the Thornhill case, it would still have to meet the requirements of the "equal protection"
clause." That is, it could not abridge the common law right to picket, without similarly restricting the competitive techniques at the disposal of employers. Should the national defense program be seriously impeded by strikes and picketing, and should the
courts become persuaded that the national interests are subject to "clear and present
dangers," it seems probable that the rights of labor, including that of peaceful picketing,
will be abridged as in the present Canadian case.
'4 Lindsay, Council and Court: The Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939,39 Mich. L. Rev. 561
(1941). Freedom of speech has been abridged when such speaking constituted danger to the
state. Herndon v. Lowry, 3or U.S. 242 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 66 (1919);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (igig); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (191g).
Religious freedom has been restricted when it conflicts with the interests of "national
unity." Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (194o), noted in 4o Col. L. Rev.

1o66 (294o).

U.S. 47 (1919).
U.S. 652 (1925). But see the dissent of Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., in which they
urged that no "clear and present danger" had been proved.
17 274 U.S. 357 (1927), noted in 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 198 (1927), and 22 Ill. L. Rev. 54x
Xs 249
'6

268

(1928).

8.301 U.S.

242 (1937).

'9Wechsler, The Clear and Present Danger Test, 9 Am. Law School Rev. 881 (1941).
"0U.S. Const. amend. 14, § i (in terms applicable only to state statutes).

